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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the impact of the prevailing state ownership in the Chinese stock market on 
corporate governance and the financial regulatory system respectively as the internal and external 
monitoring mechanisms to deter corporate fraud and protect investors. In line with the literature that 
state ownership exaggerates the agency problem, we find that the retained state ownership in 
privatised firms increases the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud. For the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), however, larger state ownership is associated with a lower incidence of 
enforcement actions. This is attributed to the mutual political affiliation of the fraudulent SOEs and 
the regulatory commission. A new regulation “Solutions for Listed Firm Checks” promulgated in 
March 2001 has mitigated this effect by empowering the regulatory commission to increase the 
severity of regulatory conditions. Our evidence confirms the improvement in the regulatory 
environment and investor protection in the Chinese stock market brought about by the regulatory 
reform and development.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Although China has experienced dramatic development in its capital markets, the influence of the 
state remains dominant in many respects. The state controls nearly 80% of the listed firms in the 
Chinese stock market (Chen et al., 2009) and retains ownership in nearly half of the privatized listed 
firms (Chen et al., 2008). Meanwhile, the state remains influential in the legal and financial 
regulatory system, undermining judicial and regulatory independence (Chen, 2003; Allen et al., 
2005; and Chen et al., 2005). Such institutional features have been found to affect the effectiveness 
of monitoring listed firms and investor protection, but its impact on regulatory inspection and 
enforcement against fraud is as yet under-researched. This paper intends to shed light on this issue. 
 
The determinants of fraud have been widely discussed in the literature of finance, economics, law 
and business ethics. International evidence (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley et al., 2000; 
Unzun et al., 2004; and Chen et al., 2006) suggests that board independence measured by the 
proportion of independent or outside directors, and the presence of an audit committee help to 
enhance the internal monitoring mechanisms and consequently reduce the incidence of fraud. In 
addition to the board of directors, a supervisory board also plays a monitoring role for Chinese listed 
firms. Jia et al. (2009) and Ding et al. (2011), however, show that this is not effective in deterring 
fraudulent activities, but passively reacts to enforcement actions. Firth et al. (2005) show that the 
China’s Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (regulatory commission hereafter) is concerned 
about fraud because auditors are sanctioned for failing to detect and report certain material 
misstatement frauds. Chen et al. (2005) show that the regulatory commission is not a toothless tiger 
as its enforcement actions decrease the stock price of the fraudulent firms.  
 
These studies have weaknesses in that they fail to consider the impact of state ownership of the 
listed firms on the effectiveness of external monitoring mechanisms, although Chow (1997), 
Anderson (2000), Chen (2003) and Allen et al. (2005) acknowledge that political connections play 
an important role in the Chinese legal and financial regulatory systems, and the laws and regulations 
are not effectively enforced when the politically powerful defendants are involved. We therefore 
expect that fraud inspection differs across firms with various strengths of political connections. In 
addition, the impact of exogenous regulatory changes has not been considered in the literature; in 
particular, the consequence of the new regulation “Solutions for Listed Firm Checks”, promulgated 
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in 2001, has not been investigated. Finally, the data used in some of the studies were collected from 
newspapers and could miss some enforcement actions. This paper aims to remedy these 
shortcomings by arguing that state ownership plays an important role in the effectiveness of both 
corporate governance and legal/regulatory systems, as internal and external monitoring mechanisms 
respectively, and that regulatory changes also influence the regulatory environment.  
  
To carry out our analysis, we include all regulatory enforcements of fraud from 1999 to 2008 in the 
Chinese stock market and respectively construct a firm-year sample and a matching-firm sample as 
robustness checks of each other. We classify the listed firms into state-owned enterprise (SOEs) and 
non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). Our main findings are as follows. For non-SOEs, the ratio 
of state ownership is positively related to the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud. 
This confirms our prediction that state ownership weakens the internal monitoring mechanism of the 
listed firms leaving opportunities for management to commit fraud. This is in line with the literature 
(see Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Clarke, 2003; Cheung et al., 2010; and Gul et al., 2010) that state 
ownership aggravates agency problems. Meanwhile, the fraudulent activities in non-SOEs are likely 
to be uncovered by the regulatory commission in that they lack political resources which could 
otherwise provide favourable regulatory conditions (Anderson, 2000; and Allen et al., 2005). 
 
For SOEs, however, we find that the ratio of state ownership is negatively related to the incidence of 
regulatory enforcements against fraud. Although the literature suggests that SOEs with concentrated 
state ownerships are associated with even weaker corporate governance, they tend to affiliate with 
the central government which has the supreme power. The politically powerful affiliations of these 
fraudulent SOEs could bring certain privileges in the regulatory environment and help them to avoid 
the non-transparent selective inspections from the regulatory commission. Such privileges of 
political connection, however, have been substantially weakened by the new regulation “Solutions 
for Listed Firm Checks” promulgated in March 2001 to replace the old regulation “Solutions to 
Carry Out Listed Firm Checks System”. This new regulation mandates regular and detailed fraud 
inspections on all listed firms to substitute for the practice of selective inspections, empowering the 
regulatory commission and increasing inspection severity (Chen et al., 2005). We document an 
increase in the incidence of regulatory enforcements on SOEs with larger state ownerships and 
richer in political resources following the promulgation of the new regulations; while the sanction 
incidence on non-SOEs is not significantly affected. This suggests that the fraud inspection and 
enforcement actions are subject to less political intervention under the new regulation. These 
findings exist in both the firm-year sample and the matching-firm sample, and are robust to the 
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controls of firm characteristics (i.e. size, growth), operating performance, corporate governance (i.e. 
ownership concentration, CEO duality, board size and board independence) as well as industry and 
region fixed effects.  
 
Our findings contribute to the literature in several ways. This is the first study, to our knowledge, to 
compare the effects of state ownership on the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud 
between SOEs and non-SOEs. For the corporate governance literature, we empirically confirm the 
argument that state ownership damages the effectiveness of internal monitoring mechanisms. For the 
literature on legal and regulatory systems, we provide new evidence that state affiliation of both the 
listed firms and the regulatory commission harms regulatory independence and regulation 
enforcement.  In addition, this is also the first study, to our knowledge, to examine the exogenous 
regulatory changes on the severity of fraud inspection. For the literature on economic reform, we 
show that the new regulation of “Solutions for Listed Firm Checks” yields a beneficial impact to this 
emerging stock market of China. Evidence of an increase in the incidence of regulatory 
enforcements in SOEs with rich political resources suggests a decline in the privilege of political 
connections, which in turn enhances regulatory enforcement, and improves shareholder protection 
and the investment environment. It adds to the literature on fraud by showing that not only internal 
monitoring mechanisms, but also external monitoring mechanisms contribute to enforcement against 
fraud.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops 
the testable hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research design and sample characteristics. Section 4 
interprets the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature and Hypothesis 
2.1. Internal Governance and Fraud 
 
Board Characteristics 
 
The board of directors is one of the most crucial vehicles in corporate governance mechanisms to 
provide internal monitoring. Poor oversight of management through weak corporate governance can 
provide opportunities for management to carry out fraud (Dechow et al., 1996). John and Senbet 
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(1998) find that board characteristics, including board independence, CEO turnover, board size and 
committee structure, determine board effectiveness, which consequently affects the incidence of 
fraud. Independent (outside) directors are believed to be able to increase the board’s ability to 
monitor management effectively (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and enhance shareholder wealth 
maximization (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. (1996) identify the 
important role of the independent (outside) directors in reducing the likelihood of financial 
statement fraud respectively from their samples of 75 firms from 1980 to 1991 and 92 similar firms 
from 1982 to 1992. Beasley et al. (2000) perform analysis of fraud within three volatile industries 
(technology, health care, and financial services). They notice the varying fraud techniques across 
industries and find a majority of outside directors to be less common in fraudulent firms compared 
with non-fraudulent industry benchmarks. Uzun et al. (2004) also have the same findings based on 
133 fraudulent or criminal firms from 1978 to 2001. Evidence of emerging stock markets from Chen 
et al. (2006) and Firth et al. (2010) shows that outside directors and directors with an accounting or 
financial background help to reduce the fraudulent practice of Chinese listed firms.  
 
In many listed firms, an audit committee is appointed to examine information accuracy and forms a 
part of the internal monitoring structure. Information accuracy helps to enhance the monitoring 
quality of the board and ensures the board remains vigilant.  Although Beasley (1996) documents no 
evidence in his sample, Dechow et al. (1996) find that the presence of an audit committee helps to 
reduce fraud. Beasley et al. (2000) and Uzun et al. (2004) further indicate the importance of the 
composition of the audit committee: audit committees in fraudulent firms tend to have smaller 
percentages of outside and independent directors, and have lower meeting frequency. Chen et al. 
(2006) show that auditors with better quality, measured by the audit firm size, are more capable of 
deterring and correcting fraud.  
 
In addition to the board of directors, a supervisory board serves as an additional monitoring organ 
for Chinese listed firms following the German corporate governance model. Dahya et al. (2003) find 
that investors care about the supervisory board report, but the supervisory board in most of the firms 
acts as a censored watchdog rather than an independent supervisor. This evidence does not justify 
the usefulness of the supervisory board in China. Jia et al. (2009) and Ding et al. (2011) show that 
the supervisory board only passively reacts to the regulatory enforcement and increased meeting 
frequency is not helpful in deterring fraud or recurrence of fraud.  
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Finally, although the characteristics of the management, such as the duality of CEO and Chairman 
roles and CEO tenure, influence corporate governance (John and Senbet, 1998), their effects on the 
likelihood of fraud have mixed results. There is no significant impact documented in Beasley (1996), 
Beasley et al. (2000), Uzun et al. (2004), and Chen et al. (2006), but there is in Dechow et al. (1996). 
Denis et al. (2006) show that option-based compensation could serve as an incentive for the 
management to engage in fraudulent activities.  
 
Ownership Characteristics 
 
Besides board characteristics, the ownership structure has also been found to play an important role 
in corporate governance.  In China, 80% of the listed firms are state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) with 
the state as the dominant shareholder (Chen et al., 2009).  State ownership is also prevalent in the 
privatized non-SOEs: although control has been transferred from the state to private investors as a 
result of privatization, the state often retains a proportion of ownership as a non-dominant or 
minority shareholder (Chen et al., 2008). State ownership and especially concentrated state 
ownership could aggravate the agency problem (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) in that state 
shareholders tend to operate firms for political purposes such as controlling sensitive industries 
(Clarke, 2003) and reducing local unemployment rate (Fan et al., 2007), instead of shareholder 
wealth maximization. Cheung et al. (2010) empirically verify that state ownership in both SOEs and 
non-SOEs is negatively associated with the corporate governance quality index (CGI) constructed in 
their study. In addition, state ownership is found to weaken the information environment of listed 
firms (Gul et al., 2010), and this further holds back the monitoring functions of the board and 
outside investors. These results suggest that state ownership directly and indirectly undermines the 
effectiveness of the internal monitoring mechanisms, thereby increasing the chances of fraudulent 
activities. 
2.2. External Governance and Fraud 
 
Outside Investors  
 
In addition to internal governance, listed firms are subject to other sources of oversight or 
supervision. From the culture perspective, Lu (1997 and 2008) argues that Chinese traditional 
Confucian ethics may help to develop business ethics. More importantly, outside investors, through 
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the wealth implication of stock price, form an important part of the external monitoring mechanism: 
disclosed fraud leads to a depression of the stock price, and consequently decreases in shareholders’ 
wealth and executives’ equity-based compensation. In the Chinese stock market, however, state 
shareholders and executives in SOEs are much less concerned with the stock price because the state 
shares are subject to imposed trading constraints and are restricted from free trading
 1
 (Chen et al., 
2008; Hou and Howell, 2011), and because the executives’ compensations in SOEs are found to be 
not significantly related to the stock return (Firth et al., 2006). Hence, the wealth implication of 
stock price tends to be inadequate to urge state shareholders and executives in SOEs to deter 
fraudulent activities.  
 
Financial Institutions 
 
Disclosed fraud can jeopardize reputation and credibility of the fraudulent firm and consequently 
affect its ability to raise capital and its cost of capital. When the share price drops, the firms need to 
issue more shares to raise the same amount of capital from the equity market. Institutional investors, 
such as fund companies, may refuse to purchase the issued shares due to the decreased liquidity and 
information quality following the announcement of fraud as documented in Dechow et al. (1996), 
Chen et al. (2005) and Firth et al. (2010). Likewise, the damaged credibility could also prevent 
fraudulent firms from getting loans from banks, which are concerned about the accuracy of their 
accounting statements. However, firms with state ownership are less affected. Although the Chinese 
banking sector has been experiencing considerable reforms in various aspects, the state still controls 
virtually all of the sizable banks in China, and political connections continue to play an important 
role in gaining access to bank finance. Frith et al. (2009) note that the state shareholder, no matter 
whether it is in a dominant position or not, is able to help either state-owned or private firm to obtain 
bank loans. Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that politically connected firms are able to borrow 45% 
more from government banks than non-connected firms. In like manner, almost all securities 
companies are controlled by the government (Firth et al., 2010), and politically-connected issuing 
firms enjoy significant benefits of their preference (Francis et al., 2009). Given these institutional 
features, firms with state ownership in the Chinese stock market tend to be less affected by the 
damaged credibility and thus have less strong incentives to ensure that fraud does not occur. 
 
Chinese Legal and Regulatory Systems 
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Allen et al. (2005) indicate the underdevelopment of the legal system in China by pointing out 
government interference in the legal system and the lack of legal enforcement. The legal system 
provides few options for minority investors to take private enforcement action against the 
misconduct of blockholders (Jiang et al., 2010). Chinese courts are believed to be not politically 
powerful and consequently are reluctant to take cases involving (politically) powerful defendants 
(Clarke, 2003); and this is even more true for the main securities regulator CSRC (see Anderson, 
2000, Chen et al., 2005; and Chen et al., 2006). Among others, the duties for this regulatory 
commission include formulating regulations for the securities markets, examining and supervising 
listed firms. The regulatory commission is not independent of the government, but financed and 
answerable to the State Council (Chen et al., 2005), which also appoints its senior directors. 
Meanwhile, many of its supervisees, i.e. listed firms, are also affiliated with the government. Chen 
et al. (2009) show that around 14% of listed firms are affiliated to central government, and around 
66% of the listed firms are affiliated to the provincial, local governments or their agencies known as 
the state asset management bureaus. Fan et al. (2007) further show that 27% of the CEOs of the 
newly partially privatized firms in China are former or current government bureaucrats. Li et al. 
(2006) observe that, due to the excessive government regulation and the weak legal system, private 
entrepreneurs also try to participate in politics in order to acquire certain privileges or resources 
brought about by their political connections. This is backed up by the argument in Chow (1997) that 
China has the appearance of a semi-legal system with the other half being supplied by the informal 
(political) network. Because politics and adjudication are often mixed and there is no effective 
judicial independence, to what extent the laws and regulations are enforced depends partially on the 
political resources of the involved parties (Chen, 2003). The SOEs with larger state ownerships are 
believed to be endowed with richer political resources as they are more commonly affiliated to the 
central government (Chen et al., 2009), and the state has a stronger intention to maintain its 
influence in these firms, and helps to secure favourable legal and regulatory conditions (Allen et al., 
2005).  
 
The regulatory commission used to carry out fraud inspection in accordance with the previous 
regulation of “Solutions to Carry Out Listed Firm Checks System” promulgated in December 1996, 
which was believed to be far too generous in that the regulatory commission adopted a practice of 
selective inspection on the listed firms (Chen et al., 2005). The non-transparent timing and sampling 
method to inspect listed firms were solely and privately decided by the regulatory commission. Due 
to the aforementioned institutional features, which gives rise to a conflict of interest between the 
“fair play” in practicing regulation and the monopoly power of the state (Allen et al., 2005), the 
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regulatory commission may choose not to inspect the firms with rich political resources. Fraudulent 
activities are thus less likely to be uncovered or incur enforcement actions.   
 
The situation could be mitigated by the new and more severe regulation “Solutions for Listed Firm 
Checks” promulgated to replace the “Solutions to Carry Out Listed Firm Checks System” in March 
2001. The new regulation abolished selective inspection and induced regular checks and special 
checks, which are more comprehensive and detailed (Chen et al., 2005). The regulatory checks 
mandates the inspection of all listed firms including these with rich political resources, and the 
special checks assigns specialised inspection items. The new regulation is therefore expected to 
increase the authority of the regulatory commission and inspection severity by putting the firms with 
rich political resources under increased scrutiny. Although the new regulation does not make the 
regulatory commission independent, or guarantee that every fraud in these firms is uncovered and 
incurs effective enforcement, it is expected to increase the incidence of disclosed frauds and 
subsequent regulatory enforcements in these firms.  
2.3. Hypotheses Development 
 
 
The Detection of Fraud 
Regulatory enforcement can be taken only against disclosed fraud, which is a subset of total fraud. 
There may be some fraudulent activities uncovered in the inspections. We hereby express regulatory 
enforcement against disclosed fraud (Fraud) as a function of total fraud and inspection severity as 
follows: 
Fraud = f (Total Fraud, Inspection Severity)             (1) 
Both Total Fraud and Inspection Severity are expected to positively influence Fraud in that firms 
with more fraudulent activities are more likely to be found out, and fraudulent activities are more 
likely to be identified under closer scrutiny. As Total Fraud is unobservable, Fraud is used as its 
proxy in the literature, the impact of the Inspection Severity, however, tends to be ignored. Given 
the discussed institutional features of the Chinese stock market, we argue that inspection severity 
differs across listed firms with different entity. In particular, non-SOEs are treated impartially in 
fraud inspections because regulatory commission is independent of them; whereas SOEs are treated 
favourably because of the mutual political affiliation between them and the regulatory commission.  
10 
 
 
Non-SOEs 
Given the institutional features that the state still retains some ownership in many privatised firms 
i.e. non-SOEs (Chen et al., 2008), and the evidence that state ownership holds back the information 
environment (Gul et al., 2010), corporate governance (Cheung et al., 2010), and consequently 
internal monitoring mechanisms, fraudulent activities are expected to be more frequent in non-SOEs 
with large state ownerships than non-SOEs with low or nil state ownership. Despite having some 
retained state ownership, non-SOEs are not affiliated with the government, and therefore lack the 
political resources to avoid fraud inspection to conceal misconducts. Hence, fraudulent activities in 
non-SOEs are likely to be uncovered and to incur enforcement actions. We thereby hypothesize that:  
 
H1. In non-SOEs, state ownership increases the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud. 
 
SOEs 
Although state ownership of SOEs hampers the internal monitoring mechanism to deter fraudulent 
activities, SOEs have government affiliation which plays an important role in the semi-legal system 
(Chow, 1997) and which could influence the inspection severity of the regulatory commission to 
bring about favourable regulatory conditions. This is expected to be more pronounced in the SOEs 
with larger state ownership, because their political connection tends to stronger and they tend to 
affiliate with the ultimate authority i.e. the central government (Chen et al., 2009). Controlled by the 
government, the regulatory commission is reluctant to enforce regulation effectively when 
government’s affiliates of this kind are involved, and may even choose not to put these firms under 
scrutiny. This is possible when inspections take place in selected listed firms only under the 
regulation of “Solutions to Carry Out Listed Firm Checks System” promulgated in 1996. We hereby 
hypothesize that: 
 
H2. In SOEs, state ownership decreases the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud. 
 
New Regulation 
The new regulation “Solutions for Listed Firm Checks” promulgated in 2001 endows the regulatory 
commission with greater authority and enhances the inspection severity by mandating “regular 
checks” on all listed firms and “special checks” on specialised items to replace the non-transparent 
“selective checks” required in the previous regulation “Solutions to Carry Out Listed Firm Checks 
System” promulgated in 1996 (Chen et al., 2005). The SOEs with large state ownership, which have 
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poor corporate governance but rich political resources, can no longer avoid inspection, and their 
fraudulent activities become more likely to be uncovered and incur regulatory enforcements than 
previously. We thereby hypothesize that: 
 
H3. The promulgation of the new regulation “Solutions for Listed Firm Checks” in 2001 is 
associated with an increase in the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud in the SOEs 
with larger state ownership. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Research Design 
  
To empirically test the predictions in hypotheses H1and H2, we apply a probit regression model as 
follows:  
 
   
k
k kk
ControlSORSOESORSOEFraud
1 33210
.                (2) 
 
where Fraud is a dummy variable assigned to 1 if the firm is subject to a regulatory enforcement against 
fraud, and 0 otherwise; SOE is a dummy variable assigned to 1 for state-owned enterprises, and 0 
otherwise. SOR is the state ownership ratio which is measured by the percentage of shares held by the 
state. Note that the state retains minority ownership in some privatized listed firms. SOE and SOR are 
thereby interacted. A set of 1-year lagged control variables are incorporated to control the firm 
characteristics, firm operating performance, and corporate governance, including the natural logarithm of 
market capitalisation (LnMC), price-to-book ratio (PB), industry-median adjusted return on assets 
(IROA), dummy variable of ownership concentration (OwnCon is equal to 1 if the Herfindahl index 
based on the top 10 largest blockholders of the firm is above the median of the yearly observations, and 0 
otherwise),  dummy variable of foreign control (Foreign is equal to 1 if the dominant shareholder of the 
firm is a foreign investor, and 0 otherwise), dummy variable of duality (Duality is equal to 1 if CEO 
holds the position of the board chair, and 0 otherwise), dummy variable of board meetings (DBmeeting is 
equal to 1 if the number of board meetings is above the median value of the yearly observations, and 0 
otherwise), dummy variable of board size (DBsize is equal to 1 if the number of board members is above 
the median value of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise), the dummy variable of the ratio of the 
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independent directors in the board (DInd is equal to 1 if the ratio is above the median value of the yearly 
observations, and 0 otherwise), and the dummy variable of the supervisory board size (DSsize is equal to 
1 if the number of supervisory board members is above the median value of the yearly observations, and 
0 otherwise). The control variables are lagged for 1-year to deal with the causality issue. Industry and 
region dummies are also included to control for the impact of industry and regional effects. The industry 
dummies are constructed based on the first two digits of the GICS (Global Industry Classification 
Standard) codes. The region dummies are constructed by following Frith et al. (2006), in which the firms 
are grouped into four different regions based on the levels of economic development: 1. Shanghai and 
Shenzhen; 2. The more developed areas including the open cities and provinces along the coast; 3. The 
inland provinces; and 4. the least developed area in the north-western part of the country.  In Equation (2), 
coefficients    and    respectively capture the impacts of state ownership on the incidence of regulatory 
enforcement against fraud in non-SOEs and in SOEs. If      (    ), then state ownership is 
associated with higher (lower) incidences of enforcement actions in non-SOEs (SOEs), supporting our 
prediction in hypothesis H1 (H2). 
 
To test hypothesis H3, we apply the following probit regression model in the samples of SOEs and 
non-SOEs respectively:  
 
   
k
k kk
ControlSORPostNRSORPostNRFraud
1 33210
.        (3) 
 
where Fraud remains the dummy variable assigned to 1 if the firm is subject to regulatory 
enforcement against fraud, and 0 otherwise; PostNR is a dummy variable assigned to 1 for the years 
after the promulgation of the new regulation “Solutions for Listed Firm Checks” i.e. 2001 onwards, 
and 0 otherwise; SOR is the state ownership ratio measured by the percentage of shares held by the 
state. SOR and PostNR are interacted to capture the impact of the new regulation on the incidence of 
regulatory actions among firms with larger state ownership. The same set of control variables are 
incorporated to control the firm characteristics, firm operating performance, and corporate 
governance. These control variables remain subject to a 1-year lag to cope with the causality 
problem. If 03 SOE  (i.e. the coefficient of the interaction term, SORPostNR. , in the sample of 
SOEs is significantly positive) the hypothesis H3 is supported in the sense that the new regulation 
improves the regulatory enforcement among the firms with rich political resources. In fact, this also 
reinforces our hypothesis H2 because if the smaller incidence of the regulatory enforcements on 
these SOEs were not due to the favourable regulatory condition brought by their political 
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connections as we argued, but other underlying reasons such as the argument of their good corporate 
governance as a result of the alignment effect of the ownership concentration in Ding et al. (2007), 
the new regulation with increased inspection severity would not give rise to higher incidence of the 
regulatory enforcement actions on them. We predict that the SOEnon3  (i.e. the interaction term,
SORPostNR. , in the sample of non-SOEs) is not significant in that the regulatory commission is 
independent of the non-SOEs, and treats them impartially in fraud inspection at all times.  
3.2. Sample Description and Characteristics 
 
The data of regulatory enforcement against fraud, firm identity (i.e. SOE or non-SOE); firm 
characteristics, operating performance and the corporate governance indicators are taken from the 
CCER/Sinofin (China Centre for Economic Research). The state ownership ratio and the corporate 
governance variables are from GTA/CSMAR (China Stock Market and Accounting Research). The 
sample period covers a decade from 1999 to 2008. We take 1999 as the starting year because the 1-
year lagged corporate governance variables used in this study are only available since 1998 in the 
database and also because there were overlapping supervision responsibilities of the regulatory 
commission with other agency bodies until 1998 (Chen et al., 2005). To perform empirical analysis, 
we construct two sets of sample, namely a firm-year sample and a matching-firm sample as a 
robustness checks of each other.  The matching-firm sample is constructed in the same way as Jia et 
al. (2009) that each fraudulent firm is matched with a non-fraudulent firm within 20% of its size, 
measured by the book value of total assets,  from the same industry.    
 
The yearly and industry distributions of disclosed fraudulent activities and the fraudulent firms are 
presented in Table 1. In panel A, the numbers of disclosed fraudulent activities (NFraud), fraudulent 
firms (FFirm) and firms with multiple fraudulent activities (MFFirm) soared in 2001. The number 
of fraudulent SOEs, the ratio of fraudulent firms relative to total firms (FFirm/Total), and the ratio 
of fraudulent SOEs relative to the total SOEs (SOEF/SOE) also peak in the year of 2001, in which 
the new regulation “Solutions for Listed Firm Checks” was promulgated to increase the inspection 
severity. This is in support of our prediction about the effects of the new regulation in H3. Note that 
our observations are larger than that documented in Chen et al. (2006) because their data was 
manually collected from newspaper and perhaps with some omissions. Panel B shows the numbers 
of fraudulent activities and fraudulent firms in various industries. The ratio of disclosed fraudulent 
firms (FFirm/Total) is larger than the ratio of disclosed fraudulent SOEs (SOEF/SOE) across all 
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industries. Given the worse corporate governance of SOEs noted in the literature, this may imply 
their favourable regulatory conditions. The telecommunication services industry, which includes 
only 25 firm-year observations, is associated with the highest ratios of fraudulent firms and 
fraudulent SOEs. In addition, the ratios are also relatively high among consumer staples, 
information technology, and financial industries. This coincides with the argument of low-integrity 
in banks and investment banks in Jensen (2010). Beasley et al. (2000) also point out that the industry 
traits could affect the commission of fraud. We therefore apply the industry fixed effects in our 
empirical analysis to make sure the results are not driven by a few industries.  
4. Empirical Findings  
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A and B of Table 2 respectively presents descriptive statistics of the variables in the firm-year 
sample and the matching-firm sample used in our analysis. In panel A, about 4% of firms are subject 
to regulatory enforcement against fraud. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for 73.09% of the 
total number of Chinese listed firms, and the overall mean (median) state ownership ratio is as large 
as 32.07% (34.63%), indicating the prevailing influence of the state. The ratio of firms with a 
foreign dominant shareholder is as small as 0.88%. Panel B compares the firm characteristics and 
corporate governance of the fraudulent firms and non-fraudulent firms in the matching-firm sample.  
For each fraudulent firm, a non-fraudulent firm of similar size (within 20% difference in the book 
value of total assets) from the same industry is matched to construct the matching-firm sample by 
following Jia et al. (2009). The fraudulent firms with missing control variables or matching firms are 
dropped, and the final sample includes 409 pairs of firms. It shows that the fraudulent firms are 
associated with larger size, worse past operating performance, CEO duality, and lower board 
meeting frequency. This preliminary result suggests the importance of corporate governance to deter 
fraud.  
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix between the main variables. The regulatory enforcement 
against fraud (Fraud) is negatively related to both the state entity (SOE) and state ownership ratio 
(SOR), but positively related to the promulgation of the new regulation (PostNR). This is in support 
of our hypotheses. In addition, value firms, large firms, and firms with sound corporate governance 
are associated with lower incidence of enforcements actions. The negative correlation between past 
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operating performance and enforcement implies that the motivation of the firms to commit fraud is 
to prevent being delisted by the exchange. Chinese listed firms with 2-year consecutive losses will 
be “Specially Treated” and those with 3-year consecutive losses will be delisted (see Liu and Lu, 
2007). On the contrary, the major motivations for earnings manipulation in the US have been 
identified as the desire to attract external financing at low cost (Dechow et al., 1996) and to obtain 
an increase in share price (Kellogg and Kellogg, 1991). 
4.2. Test of Hypothesis 1 and 2 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the test of hypotheses H1 and H2. We examine and compare the 
impact of state ownership (SOR) on the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud in SOEs 
and non-SOEs by regressing the dependent dummy variable (Fraud) on the state entity (SOE), the 
state ownership ratio (SOR) and their interaction term (SOE.SOR) as shown in Equation (2). The 
regressions I and II in Table 4 are based on firm-year sample while regressions III and IV are based 
on matching-firm sample. To construct the matching-firm sample, each fraudulent firm is matched 
with a non-fraudulent firm within 20% difference of size in terms of book value from same industry 
(See Jia et al., 2009). The regressions I and III include only the key variables and 1-year lagged firm 
characteristics while the regression II and IV also incorporate 1-year lagged control variables of firm 
performance, corporate governance, as well as industry and region dummies.  
Capturing the impact of state ownership in non-SOEs, the coefficients of state ownership (SOR) in 
regression I (0.5916) and III (0.8640) are significantly positive. This shows that the non-SOEs with 
a larger state ownership ratio, are more likely to be subject to regulatory enforcements against fraud, 
and therefore supports our hypothesis H1. On the one hand, non-SOEs with larger state ownership 
have less effective internal monitoring mechanisms because of the documented worse corporate 
governance and information environment in the literature, giving increased opportunities for 
fraudulent activities; on the other hand, non-SOEs are not officially affiliated with the government 
and therefore lack political affiliation to help them to avoid fraud inspection and/or enforcement 
actions.  With 1 standard deviation increase (i.e. 0.2527 in the firm-year sample, and 0.2469 in the 
matching-firm sample as shown in Table 2)  in the state ownership, the results from regression I and 
III respectively suggest 14.95% and 21.33% rise in the incidence of regulatory actions in non-SOEs, 
implying the economic significance of the results.  
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The impact of the state ownership in SOEs is captured by the coefficients of the interaction term 
SOE.SOR, which are, as predicted in hypothesis H2, significantly negative in regression I (-0.9797) 
and III (-1.2047).  Although state ownership has been found to exaggerate the agency problem in the 
literature, it also reflects the interests and intention of the government to maintain its influence and 
strengthens the political connection of SOEs. Chen et al. (2009) show that SOEs with higher state 
ownership tend to affiliate with the central government i.e. the supreme authority. The political 
affiliations of higher ranks are more likely to bring about privileges for the SOEs in the regulatory 
system, and therefore decrease the incidence of regulatory enforcement actions on them. With 1 
standard deviation increase (i.e. 0.2527 in the firm-year sample, and 0.2469 in the matching-firm 
sample as shown in Table 2) in the state ownership, the results of regression (I) and (III) 
respectively suggest 24.76% and 29.74% reduction in the incidence of enforcement actions in SOEs, 
showing that the economic significance of the impact.  
Hypotheses H1 and H2 are, again, empirically verified in regressions II and IV with all control 
variables incorporated and with industry/region fixed effects applied. The coefficients of SOR 
(SOE.SOR) remain significantly positive (negative) as 0.7179 and 0.9565 (-0.7693 and -1.1662) in 
regression II and IV respectively; and the economic significance remains strong in the presence of 
control variables. Among the control variables, the operating performance (IROA) and the dummy 
variable of meeting frequency are significantly negative in both samples. This confirms the 
argument in Liu and Lu (2007) that firms with poor operating performance have incentives to 
manage earnings to prevent being de-listed. Moreover, in an untabulated analysis, we replace the 
industry-median adjusted performance measure (IROA) with the raw measure (ROA i.e. Return-on-
asset) and a dummy variable of the imminent de-listing risk (ST is equal to 1 if the firm is labeled as 
“special treated” by the exchange for its consecutive losses, and 0 otherwise), and the results are 
consistent. In particular, firms with 1 standard deviation decrease in IROA and firms being labeled 
as “special treated” are associated with about one third increase in the incidence of regulatory 
actions. This has important policy implication for the regulatory commission and practical 
implication for the board that firms with poor performance and delisting risk deserve severe 
inspection and monitoring in order to better protect the investors. In addition, the firms with meeting 
frequency above the median is associated with 22.30% (31.75%) lower possibility of receiving 
sanctions from the regulatory commission as suggested in regression  II (IV). This is in line with the 
argument in Uzun et al. (2004) that meeting frequency could make boards better perform their duties 
and enhance corporate governance. In an untabulated robustness check, we incorporate 1-year 
lagged key variables to address the potential problem of endogeneity, adjust the clustering standard 
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errors in the firm-year sample, and perform the analysis in a sub-sample of 446 cases of “fraudulent 
statement and/or withholding disclosure”. The results remain consistent with the findings  in Table 4.  
4.3. Test of Hypothesis 3 
Table 5 presents the results for the test of hypothesis H3. We separately examine the impact of an 
exogenous change in the inspection severity brought about by the new regulation of “Solutions for 
Listed Firm Checks” promulgated in 2001 on the regulatory enforcement against fraud in SOEs and 
non-SOEs. We regress the regulatory enforcement against the state ownership ratio (SOR), the new 
regulation dummy (PostNR), and their interaction term (SOR.PostNR) as shown in Equation (3). 
Again, regressions I and II (III and IV) are applied on the firm-year sample (matching-firm sample). 
Regression I and III (II and IV) are tested in the sample of SOEs (non-SOEs).  
Capturing the impact of the regulatory change in the SOEs with larger state ownership ratio (SOR), 
the coefficients of the interaction term (SOR.PostNR) are significantly positive in regression I 
(1.2629) and III (3.9804). This supports our hypothesis H3 by demonstrating that, albeit their rich 
political resources, the SOEs with high state ownership and consequently poor corporate governance 
become more likely to be sanctioned by the regulatory commission under the new severe regulatory 
conditions. When the inspection of more detailed items on all listed firms is mandated by the 
regulation, these SOEs can no longer avoid inspections, and the fraudulent activities are more likely 
to be uncovered. Specifically, for listed firms with the median level of state ownership in the firm-
year sample (i.e. 34.63% as shown in Table 2), the new regulation raises their incidence of 
regulatory enforcement actions by 43.76%, showing the economic significance of the impact. This 
result in fact reinforces our hypothesis H2 in that the documented lower incidence of sanction 
among the SOEs with higher state ownership in Table 4 is not due to better corporate governance, 
but favorable regulatory conditions. If the result were due to better corporate governance and lower 
occurrence of fraudulent activities, this regulatory change would not affect them. In addition, it is 
worth noting that the sum of the coefficients of SOR and SOR.PostNR is close to 0, suggesting that 
the privilege of SOEs with rich political resources are roughly eliminated in the new regulatory 
condition. 
As we predicted, the impact of the new regulation is not significant among the SOEs with inferior 
political resources and non-SOEs independent of the regulatory commission. Because they are not 
politically powerful enough to influence the ministry-level ranked regulatory commission to enjoy 
privilege in the regulatory system, they are treated more or less impartially anyway, and the 
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regulatory change does not affect their regulatory condition. The results in Table 5 are robust with 
the control of firm characteristics, operating performance, corporate governance, and industry/region 
fixed effects. Consistent with the finding in Table 4, industry-adjusted performance (IROA) and 
dummy variable of meeting frequency (DBmeeting) remain significantly negative. As the sample 
period prior to and after the regulatory change is asymmetric in our sample, the documented impact 
may be driven by the recent years rather than the few years following the reform. We therefore 
perform the analysis based on a smaller sample of 2 years before and after the regulatory change (i.e. 
1999 to 2002) as robustness check, and find that the untabulated results remain consistent with the 
findings in Table 5.  
5. Conclusion 
 
China has been experiencing dramatic development in its capital market, but the financial regulatory 
system and investor protection remain weak. The main institutional feature, which holds back 
regulatory environment, is the dual roles played by the state. On the one hand, it controls more than 
70% of the listed firms (known as SOEs, state-owned enterprises), and retains state ownership in 
half of privatised non-SOEs; on the other hand, it controls the regulatory commission known as 
CSRC (China’s Securities Regulatory Commission). This paper documents the different effects of 
state ownership on the regulatory enforcement actions across firms with different entities. In non-
SOEs, the retained state ownership increases the incidence of regulatory enforcement against fraud 
in that the state ownership exaggerates the agency problem leaving chances for fraudulent activities. 
These misconducts are likely to be uncovered because the regulatory commission is independent of 
the non-SOEs and treats them impartially in the fraud inspection. In SOEs, however, the state 
ownership decreases the incidence of regulatory enforcement against fraud. Although the corporate 
governance in SOEs with large state ownership tends to be worse, their strong political connection 
could help to secure favourable regulatory conditions and extricate them from fraud inspections. 
Such privilege has been found to be mitigated by the new regulation “Solutions for Listed Firm 
Checks” promulgated in March 2001, which increases the inspection severity by mandating more 
comprehensive and detailed inspection on all listed firms.  
 
Our results contribute original evidence of the impacts of state ownership on the regulatory 
enforcement and investor protection. Our results also have some practical and policy implications.  
The results suggest enhance auditing and fraud inspections on the listed firms with poor past 
operating performance and the risk of de-listing as they are more likely to commit fraud. The results 
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also show that the government’s reluctance to relinquish influence in the privatised non-SOEs 
through retained state ownership hinder corporate governance.  Finally, the results confirm the 
improvement of the Chinese regulatory environment following the regulatory change. The finding 
implies that although the state will maintain its influence in the capital market in the foreseeable 
future, the improvement of investor protection is still feasible through regulatory reform and 
development.  
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Note  
1
 The imposed trading constraints in the Chinese stock market have been gradually relaxed in the 
Split Share Structure Reform which was launched in 2005 (See Firth et al., 2010; Hou and Howell, 
2011).   
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Table 1 
 
Table 1 presents a yearly and industry breakdown of our sample. The sample period covers 1999-2008 and 
includes stocks in both Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. In panel A, FraudN indicates the number of 
disclosed fraudulent activities. FFirm is the number of fraudulent firms. MFFirm is the number of firms with 
multiple fraudulent activities. FSOE is the number of fraudulent SOEs (State-owned Enterprises). Total and 
SOE respectively indicates the number of listed firms and SOEs in the Chinese stock market. In panel B, the 
industries are classified based on the first two digits of the GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) 
codes.  
 
 
Panel A 
 
Year FraudN FFirm MFFirm FSOE Total  SOE 
SOE/ 
Total 
FSOE/ 
FFirm 
FFirm/ 
Total 
SOEF/ 
SOE 
1999 13 13 0 7 911 768 84.30% 53.85% 1.43% 0.91% 
2000 17 17 0 11 1048 869 82.92% 64.71% 1.62% 1.27% 
2001 73 67 5 49 1125 925 82.22% 73.13% 5.96% 5.30% 
2002 60 50 8 40 1193 929 77.87% 80.00% 4.19% 4.31% 
2003 56 45 10 31 1257 923 73.43% 68.89% 3.58% 3.36% 
2004 70 60 10 33 1352 934 69.08% 55.00% 4.44% 3.53% 
2005 100 69 26 34 1351 934 69.13% 49.28% 5.11% 3.64% 
2006 97 71 21 32 1410 916 64.96% 45.07% 5.04% 3.49% 
2007 79 61 15 27 1526 921 60.35% 44.26% 4.00% 2.93% 
2008 39 35 2 18 1599 954 59.66% 51.43% 2.19% 1.89% 
 
Panel B 
 
  FraudN FFirm MFFirm FSOE Total  SOE 
SOE/ 
Total 
FSOE/ 
FFirm 
FFirm/ 
Total 
SOEF/ 
SOE 
Energy 17 14 1 7 339 283 83.48% 50.00% 4.13% 2.47% 
Materials 100 81 17 52 2500 1962 78.48% 64.20% 3.24% 2.65% 
Industrials 88 72 14 41 2580 1872 72.56% 56.94% 2.79% 2.19% 
Consumer 
Discretionary 113 94 16 65 2677 1866 
69.70% 69.15% 
3.51% 3.48% 
Consumer Staples 76 61 10 39 951 697 73.29% 63.93% 6.41% 5.60% 
Health Care 41 32 8 13 884 526 59.50% 40.63% 3.62% 2.47% 
Financials 45 38 6 21 1009 576 57.09% 55.26% 3.77% 3.65% 
Information 
Technology 87 66 20 30 1207 750 
62.14% 45.45% 
5.47% 4.00% 
Telecommunication 
Services 7 4 1 2 25 18 
72.00% 50.00% 
16.00% 11.11% 
Utilities 20 16 4 12 556 501 90.11% 75.00% 2.88% 2.40% 
Unclassified 10 10 0 0 44 22 50.00% 0.00% 51.82% 0.00% 
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Table 2 
 
Panel A and B respectively present the summary statistics of the variables in the firm-year sample and the 
matching-firm sample. The sample period covers 1999-2008. Fraud is a dummy variable assigned to 1 if the 
firm is subject to a regulatory enforcement against disclosed fraud, and 0 otherwise. SOE is a dummy variable 
assigned to 1 for state-owned enterprises, and 0 otherwise. SOR is the state ownership ratio which is 
measured by the percentage of shares held by the state. PostNR is a dummy variable assigned to 1 for the 
years after the promulgation of the new regulation “Solutions for Listed Firm Checks” i.e. 2001 onwards, and 
0 otherwise. The 1-year lagged control variables include natural logarithm of market capitalisation (LnMC), 
price-to-book ratio (PB), industry-median adjusted return on asset (IROA), dummy variable of ownership 
concentration (OwnCon is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the Herfindahl index based on the top 10 
largest blockholders of the firm is above the median of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise), dummy 
variable of foreign control (Foreign is equal to 1 if the dominant shareholder of the firm is a foreign investor), 
dummy variable of duality (Duality is equal to 1 if CEO holds the position of the board chair, and 0 
otherwise), dummy variable of board meetings (DBmeeting is equal to 1 if the number of board meetings is 
above the median of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise), dummy variable of board size (DBsize is equal 
to 1 if the number of board members is above the median of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise), the 
dummy variable of the ratio of the independent directors in the board (DInd is equal to 1 if the ratio is above 
the median of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise), and the dummy variable of the supervisory board 
size (DSsize is equal to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is above the median of the yearly 
observations, and 0 otherwise). 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance. 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of the Firm-Year Sample 
 
 
 
  Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75% Obs. 
Fraud 0.0394 0.1945 0 0 0 11456 
SOE 0.7309 0.4435 0 1 1 11456 
SOR 0.3207 0.2527 0.0068 0.3463 0.5396 11456 
PostNR 0.8610 0.3460 1 1 1 11456 
LnMC 20.5109 0.9349 19.8685 20.4257 21.0333 11456 
PB 4.2283 4.1464 1.9962 3.1765 5.0905 11456 
IROA -0.0015 0.0186 -0.0055 0.0001 0.0068 11456 
OwnCon 0.5082 0.5000 0 1 1 11456 
Foreign 0.0088 0.0935 0 0 0 11456 
Duality 0.0169 0.1290 0 0 0 11456 
DBmeeting 0.5850 0.4927 0 1 1 11456 
DBsize 0.3507 0.4772 0 0 1 11456 
DInd 0.5904 0.4918 0 1 1 11456 
DSsize 0.9060 0.2918 1 1 1 11456 
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Panel B. Descriptive Statistics of the Matching-Firm Sample 
 
 
 
 
  Matching-Firm Sample Fraudulent Firms 
Non-fraudulent 
Matching Firms 
Difference in 
Means 
  Median Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. t-Statistics 
SOE 1 0.6186 0.4860 1 0.6015 0.4902 1 0.6357 0.4818 -1.0322 
SOR 0.2805 0.2853 0.2469 0.2802 0.2780 0.2435 0.2808 0.2925 0.2504 -0.8911 
LnMC 20.0892 20.1461 0.8847 20.1195 20.2085 0.8917 20.0345 20.0838 0.8742 3.6932*** 
PB 3.2750 4.4485 4.7564 3.2678 4.5791 5.0609 3.2790 4.3178 4.4335 0.9236 
IROA -0.0043 -0.0154 0.0295 -0.0100 -0.0208 0.0295 -0.0020 -0.0101 0.0286 -6.5453*** 
OwnCon 0 0.3826 0.4863 0 0.3570 0.4797 0 0.4083 0.4921 -1.6186 
Foreign 0 0.0037 0.0605 0 0.0024 0.0494 0 0.0049 0.0698 -0.5769 
Duality 0 0.0147 0.1203 0 0.0122 0.1100 0 0.0171 0.1299 1.6703* 
DBmeeting 0 0.4878 0.5002 0 0.4230 0.4946 1 0.5526 0.4978 -3.7050*** 
DBsize 0 0.3289 0.4701 0 0.3178 0.4662 0 0.3399 0.4742 -0.6722 
DInd 1 0.5966 0.4909 1 0.6039 0.4897 1 0.5892 0.4926 0.5566 
DSsize 0 0.3289 0.4701 1 0.9095 0.2872 1 0.8924 0.3102 0.8680 
Obs. 818 409 409 409 
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Table 3 
 
This table presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in our analyses. The sample period covers 1999-2008. Fraud is a dummy variable assigned to 1 
if the firm is subject to a regulatory enforcement against disclosed fraud, and 0 otherwise. SOE is a dummy variable assigned to 1 for state-owned enterprises, 
and 0 otherwise. SOR is the state ownership ratio which is measured by the percentage of shares held by the state. PostNR is a dummy variable assigned to 1 
for the years after the promulgation of the new regulation “Solutions for Listed Firm Checks” i.e. 2001 onwards, and 0 otherwise. The 1-year lagged control 
variables include natural logarithm of market capitalisation (LnMC), price-to-book ratio (PB), industry-median adjusted return on asset (IROA), dummy 
variable of ownership concentration (OwnCon is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the Herfindahl index based on the top 10 largest blockholders of the 
firm is above the median of the yearly observation and 0 otherwise),  dummy variable of foreign control (Foreign is equal to 1 if the dominant shareholder of 
the firm is a foreign investor, and 0 otherwise), dummy variable of duality (Duality is equal to 1 if CEO holds the position of the board chair, and 0 otherwise), 
dummy variable of board meetings (DBmeeting is equal to 1 if the number of board meetings is above the median, and 0 otherwise), dummy variable of board 
size (DBsize is equal to 1 if the number of board members is above the median, and 0 otherwise), the dummy variable of the ratio of the independent directors 
in the board (DInd is equal to 1 if the ratio is above the median, and 0 otherwise), and the dummy variable of the supervisory board size (DSsize is equal to 1 
if the number of supervisory board members is above the median, and 0 otherwise). 
*
 denotes 1% level of significance. 
 
 
Fraud SOE SOR PostNR LnMC PB IROA OwnCon Foreign Duality DBmeeting DBsize Dind DSsize 
Fraud 1 
             SOE -0.0437* 1 
            SOR -0.0426* 0.6173* 1 
           PostNR 0.0715* -0.1313* -0.0551* 1 
          LnMC -0.0791* 0.1343* 0.0389* 0.1359* 1 
         PB 0.0441* -0.0491* -0.0824* -0.0568* 0.1248* 1 
        IROA -0.2067* 0.0551* 0.0780* 0.0106 0.3179* -0.0054 1 
       OwnCon -0.1043* 0.1954* 0.4253* -0.1053* 0.0395* -0.0684* 0.1029* 1 
      Foreign -0.0134 -0.1488* -0.1014* -0.0033 0.0218 0.0258* -0.0067 -0.0335* 1 
     Duality -0.01 -0.0231* -0.0334* -0.0929* 0.0013 0.0292* -0.0233* -0.0359* 0.0228 1 
    DBmeeting -0.0458* 0.0573* 0.0611* 0.0114 -0.0507* -0.0470* -0.0026 0.0459* -0.0036 -0.0124 1 
   DBsize -0.0554* 0.1129* 0.0803* -0.1624* 0.0907* -0.0379* -0.0017 0.0079 -0.0127 0.0102 0.0397* 1 
  DInd -0.0458* -0.1624* -0.1177* 0.2383* 0.0541* -0.1518* 0.0428* -0.1336* 0.0095 -0.0374* -0.0279* 0.0301* 1 
 DSsize -0.0288* 0.1140* 0.0934* -0.0869* 0.0376* -0.0124 0.006 0.0465* -0.0344* -0.1354* -0.0141 0.1231* 0.0227* 1 
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Table 4 
 
This table presents the empirical results of the following regression model from the firm-year sample and the matching-firm sample.  
   
k
k kk
ControlSORSOESORSOEFraud
1 33210
. 
 
, where dependent dummy variable Fraud is assigned to 1 if the firm is subject to a regulatory enforcement against disclosed fraud, and 0 otherwise; SOE is a 
dummy variable assigned to 1 for state-owned enterprises, and 0 otherwise; SOR is the state ownership ratio which is measured by the percentage of shares 
held by the state. The 1-year lagged control variables are defined in the appendix. The sample period covers 1999-2008. All t-statistics are reported and 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance. 
 
 
 
  
 
Firm-Year Sample Matching-Firm Sample 
 
Regression I Regression II Regression III Regression IV 
SOE 0.0099 0.13 -0.0166 -0.22 0.0694 0.47 0.1425 0.85 
SOR 0.5916 2.61*** 0.7179 2.84*** 0.8640 1.82* 0.9565 1.86* 
SOE.SOR -0.9797 -3.83*** -0.7693 -2.7*** -1.2047 -2.22** -1.1662 -1.94* 
LnMC -0.2117 -7.76*** -0.0751 -2.46** 0.1204 2.28** 0.2074 3.31*** 
PB 0.0209 4.61*** 0.0151 3.17*** 0.0044 0.47 0.0065 0.54 
IROA 
 
  -16.3393 -17.2***    -11.5812 -6.04*** 
OwnCon 
 
  -0.1748 -3.18***    0.0323 -0.28 
Foreign 
 
  -0.6859 -1.55    -0.5791 -0.82 
Duality 
 
  -0.2996 -1.38    -0.1106 -0.29 
DBmeeting 
 
  -0.2230 -4.73***    -0.3175 -3.16*** 
DBsize 
 
  -0.0525 -1.03    -0.0936 -0.86 
DInd 
 
  -0.0244 -0.49    0.0733 0.65 
DSsize 
 
  -0.0658 -0.84 
 
  0.1713 1.04 
Intercept 2.5400 4.6*** 0.4576 -0.54 -2.4327 -2.32** -4.6127 -3.16*** 
Industry N Y N Y 
Region N Y N Y 
Pseudo R2 0.0362 0.1499 0.0103 0.0938 
Obs. 11,460 818 
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Table 5 
 
This table presents the empirical results of the following regression model from the firm-year sample and the matching-firm sample. Each sample is further 
split into SOEs (State-owned enterprises) and Non-SOEs.  
   
k
k kk
ControlSORPostNRSORPostNRFraud
1 33210
. 
 
, where dependent dummy variable Fraud is assigned to 1 if the firm is subject to a regulatory enforcement against disclosed fraud, and 0 otherwise. SOR is 
the state ownership ratio which is measured by the percentage of shares held by the state. PostNR is a dummy variable assigned to 1 for the years after the 
promulgation of the new regulation “Solutions for Listed Firm Checks” i.e. 2001 onwards, and 0 otherwise. The 1-year lagged control variables are defined in 
the appendix. The sample period covers 1999-2008. All t-statistics are reported and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels of significance. 
 
  Firm-Year Sample Matching-Firm Sample 
 
SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE 
Regression I Regression II Regression III Regression IV 
SOR -1.2399 -2.92*** -0.1630 -0.13 -3.8181 -2.15** 0.3953 0.09 
PostNR 0.2208 1.32 0.1664 0.84 -1.6238 -2.31** 0.2043 0.39 
SOR.PostNR 1.2629 2.84*** 0.9063 0.73 3.9804 2.23** 1.4895 0.32 
LnMC -0.1103 -2.83*** -0.1048 -1.86* 0.2202 2.7*** 0.2287 1.86* 
PB 0.0186 3.05*** 0.0078 1.09 0.0062 -0.4 -0.0047 -0.19 
IROA -17.6626 -12.95*** -14.1147 -10.03*** -16.6383 -5*** -5.8114 -1.95* 
OwnCon -0.1629 -2.37** -0.2075 -2.15** -0.2227 -1.4 0.1300 0.62 
Foreign dropped -0.6940 -1.68* dropped -0.6497 -0.96 
Duality -0.4306 -1.32 -0.1256 -0.39 -0.5657 -1 0.0380 0.06 
DBmeeting -0.1962 -3.26*** -0.3118 -3.72*** -0.2298 -1.73* -0.3855 -1.94** 
DBsize -0.0533 -0.85 -0.2026 -2.02** -0.1319 -0.91 -0.2975 -1.47 
DInd -0.1552 -2.48** -0.1438 -1.4 0.0146 0.09 0.1475 0.63 
DSsize -0.0981 -0.94 -0.0792 -0.67 -0.0578 -0.24 0.5699 2.15** 
Intercept 1.4356 1.4 1.4890 1.26 -3.1972 -1.66* -4.7771 -1.78* 
Industry Y Y Y Y 
Region Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R2 0.1635 0.1849 0.1370 0.1604 
Obs. 8,397 3,083 506 312 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
 
Fraud 
 
A dummy variable assigned to 1 if the firm is subject to a regulatory enforcement against 
disclosed fraud, and 0 otherwise 
SOE  A dummy variable assigned to 1 for state-owned enterprises, and 0 otherwise 
SOR The state ownership ratio which is measured by the percentage of shares held by the state.  
PostNR 
 
A dummy variable assigned to 1 for the years after the promulgation of the new regulation 
“Solutions for Listed Firm Checks” i.e. 2001 onwards, and 0 otherwise. 
  The following control variables are lagged for 1 year to solve the causality problem: 
  LnMC The natural logarithm of market capitalisation 
PB Price-to-book ratio  
IROA Industry-median adjusted return on assets  
OwnCon 
 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the the Herfindahl index based on the top 10 largest 
blockholders of the firm is above the median value of the yearly observations, and 0 
otherwise 
Foreign 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the dominant shareholder of the firm is a foreign investor, 
and 0 otherwise 
Duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO holds the position of the board chair, and 0 otherwise 
DBmeeting 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of board meetings is above the median value of 
the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise 
DBsize 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of board members is above the median value of 
the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise 
DInd 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the ratio of independent directors is above the median value 
of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise 
DSsize 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of supervisory board members is above the 
median value of the yearly observations, and 0 otherwise 
 
The following industry and region dummies are also incorporated in our empirical analyses: 
 
The industry dummies are constructed based on the first two digits of the GICS (Global Industry 
Classification Standard) codes. 
 
The region dummies are constructed by following Frith et al. (2006), in which the firms are grouped into four 
different regions by the levels of economic development: 1. Shanghai and Shenzhen; 2. The more developed 
areas including the open cities and provinces along the coast; 3. The inland provinces; and 4. The least 
developed area in the north-western part of the country.   
